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Abstract
Since the Matabeleland massacres in the early 1980s, reconciliation remains 
unattainable in this region of Zimbabwe. Reasons for this include the fact that 
survivors of these atrocities have not received the acknowledgement they require 
from the government. As a result, their perception is that the government has 
continued to repress them by failing to provide for their needs. More so, the 
preceding episodes of violence in the region have engendered fear, anxiety and 
distress among a population that is battling to deal with its past. This article 
explores the attempts by the government and civil society representatives in the 
region to facilitate reconciliation and seeks to determine their ability to establish 
durable peace at the community level. Drawing from fi eldwork undertaken in 
Matabeleland in April 2014, this article describes what the community identifi es 
as central requirements for reconciliation to occur, as against what is provided 
by the national framework for reconciliation implemented by the government.
Keywords: Gukurahundi, acknowledgement, reconciliation, durable peace, 
Matabeleland
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Introduction
Reconciliation is a concept that falls under peacebuilding discourses, which 
refer to processes that facilitate the establishment of durable peace in times of 
democratic transition or gross human rights violations. Lederach (1997:26) 
argues that reconciliation is a peacebuilding process that assists conflicting 
groups in engaging with each other as humans-in-relationship. This is based on 
the view that when community members have a positive working relationship, 
they are likely to seek non-violent means to resolve any disputes that arise among 
them. Karen Brounéus (2003:20) defines reconciliation as ‘a societal process that 
involves the mutual acknowledgement of past sufferings and the changing of 
destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships towards 
sustainable peace’. These processes can be official (government sanctioned), for 
example the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, or unofficial 
(community-based), for example the magama spirits rituals in Mozambique.
Reconciliation is a helpful tool for peacebuilding because it encompasses both 
official and unofficial processes that serve to build a community (people in a 
particular territory) with mutual respect for each other's co-existence. Brounéus’ 
definition is adopted in this article because it emphasises the importance of 
a mutual acknowledgement of the past and the transforming of destructive 
behaviours and attitudes into constructive relationships. Such a perspective can 
help to guide the government, the civil society organisations (CSOs)1 and the 
local community towards what ought to happen for reconciliation to occur in 
Matabeleland. Incidents of violence included for discussion are the independence 
struggle from 1965 to 1979, the Gukurahundi massacres (1980–1987) and the 
post-2000 electoral violence, which subjected various communities in the region 
to mass human rights violations (Eppel 2008:2–4).
Various scholars who have written about Gukurahundi and reconciliation 
in Matabeleland, such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in 
1 CSOs operate in the context of the ‘supranational sphere of social and political 
participation, which involves various population groups who engage in dialogue, 
deliberation, confrontation and negotiation with each other and with the government and 
the business world’ (Salamon 2010:168).
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Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation (CCJPZ 1997), Eppel (2006; 
2008), Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru (2013) and Mashingaidze (2010), argue that 
the government has been reluctant to address the past injustices for fear of being 
implicated in the process. The unique contribution of this article is its focus 
on very recent expressions and perspectives elicited from community members, 
which show that after all this time, and with all the recent political changes in the 
country, the Matabeleland region continues to struggle with the violent conflict 
that occurred more than 30 years ago. Uniquely, it also brings attention to the 
effects of more recent conflict, such as the 2008 election-related violence, as well 
as to initiatives from recent institutions and policies aimed at reconciliation in 
these particular communities. Drawing from the narratives shared by the 36 
participants in the study, this article argues that reconciliation in Matabeleland 
can only begin when the government acknowledges the past and puts in place 
effective measures to address the injustices incurred. 
After the introduction, the article is divided into six sections. Firstly, it gives a 
brief account of the violence that has occurred in Matabeleland, followed by 
a description of the research techniques used to conduct the study. Thirdly, it 
describes how participants in the study perceived the manifestations of violence 
in the region in order to better understand their experiences. It then explores the 
efforts of the government and CSOs in facilitating reconciliation, followed by an 
account of what the participants shared about the processes that would facilitate 
reconciliation in their communities and region. Finally, it offers possibilities on 
a way forward as suggested by participants.
1. The Matabeleland violence
The history of violence in present day Matabeleland can be traced back to the 
pre-colonial era, but this article will focus on three episodes, namely, the Second 
Chimurenga, Gukurahundi and the election-related violence since 2000. This 
article acknowledges that violence in Zimbabwe has not been limited to the 
Matabeleland region, but focuses on this one region in an effort to understand the 
underlying issues that fuel the mistrust between the Matabeleland community 
(particularly victims of Gukurahundi) and the government (CCJPZ 1997:11). 
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The article serves as a reference point to exploring the effects of these periods of 
violent conflict on reconciliation in Matabeleland.
The Second Chimurenga of 1965–1979 was a war of liberation fought by 
liberation movements against the ruling white minority government to abolish 
the illegal occupation and control of the Zimbabwean territory by the former 
(Mlambo 2014:160). This war was brought to an end with the signing of the 
Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, which paved the way for democratic 
elections that formed a new government of Zimbabwe: made up of the minority 
Rhodesian Front (RF) Party, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 
the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the 
United African National Council (UNAC) (Chitiyo and Rupiya 2005:337). 
Reconciliation efforts of this new government emphasised building a healthy 
relationship between the former repressive white regime and the nationalist 
movements, but were not extended to address the tribal tensions within the 
black community (Mashingaidze 2010:22). The then Prime Minister Robert 
Mugabe in his 1980 inaugural speech proclaimed that all parties should ‘let 
bygones be bygones’ (Mashingaidze 2010:22). This proclamation substantiated 
the Amnesty Ordinances of 1979 and 1980 which gave amnesty without trial to 
both the Rhodesian government and the liberation movements (Mashingaidze 
2010:21). As a result, it precluded the opportunity for the victimised community 
to share their experiences and collectively acknowledge a past that claimed the 
lives of over 30 000 people (CCJPZ 1997:1). It also prevented the community 
from addressing the underlying issues amongst the black community that 
caused them to harbour a propensity for conflict amongst each other.
Mlambo (2014:147) points out that the black community in Zimbabwe was 
not integrated because during the liberation struggle there were many ethnic, 
personality and class differences within the liberation movement, which 
ultimately led to the split of ZAPU in 1963. The emerging parties, ZAPU led 
by Joshua Nkomo and ZANU-PF led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, the 
former deputy president of ZAPU, subjected the nationalist movements to a 
period of intense rivalry. Political intolerance turned the parties against each 
other and presaged a cycle of political violence between the two movements 
during the liberation struggle and after independence (Mlambo 2014:148). 
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Gukurahundi became the inevitable conflict ensuing from the lack of deep 
rooted reconciliation amongst the former liberation movements. 
Gukurahundi is a Shona term referring to ‘the first rain that washes away 
chaff before the spring’ (Eppel 2008:1). Gukurahundi was a code name for 
the Fifth Brigade2 soldiers, an army that was sanctioned by Prime Minister 
Mugabe to dismantle ZAPU and the defected military wing Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) officials (CCJPZ 1997:45). The term has been 
simultaneously adopted to refer to the massacres of over 20 000 people and 
dehumanising acts against thousands by government-sanctioned security 
forces in the Midlands and Matabeleland regions between 1980 and 1987. 
The massacres were initiated by clashes in 1980 at Entumbane demobilisation 
camp in Bulawayo between the former ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU, and 
ex-combatants of ZIPRA. These two army groups were elements of the newly 
integrated army, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) (CCJPZ 1997:6). 
Widespread conflict in the region ensued after the discovery of arms caches in 
Matabeleland at ZAPU-owned properties in 1982. An altercation in parliament 
between ZANU-PF and ZAPU, which led to the expulsion of ZAPU officials, 
exacerbated tensions leading to the defection of ex-ZIPRA combatants into the 
bush in Matabeleland and Midlands (Chitiyo and Rupiya 2005:340). The defected 
ex-ZIPRA combatants, who were mostly comprised of Ndebele speaking people, 
easily blended with the population in the two regions, as they are largely Ndebele 
speaking. The terms ‘dissidents’, ‘bandits’ and ‘Super-ZAPU’ were therefore 
used by the government to depoliticise all defected ex-ZIPRA combatants 
(CCJPZ 1997:34). Suspicions of the government that ‘dissidents’ were receiving 
undercover support from South Africa under the code name ‘Operation Drama’ 
further destabilised the already volatile security situation in the region (CCJPZ 
1997:29). The government regarded the ‘bandits’ as terrorists because during the 
liberation struggle the insurgent group ZIPRA had been trained by Russia and 
had operational tank and air units, which made it possible for the ‘dissidents’ to 
2 Fifth Brigade was a special army mainly comprised of ex-Zimbabwe African National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) combatants who were trained by North Korean commanders 
in response to the Entumbane clashes (Eppel 2008:4).
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cause widespread terror (Mlambo 2014:161). A government official among the 
research participants shared that:
ZIPRA was a credible threat to the ZANU government because during 
the liberation struggle the Russians and Cubans had trained the former 
in guerrilla warfare methods. Therefore, ZAPU members were always 
associated with their military wing ZIPRA and whenever disagreements 
occurred in the new government, ZANU felt threatened that ZAPU 
would end up using its military wing. Gukurahundi was an opportunity 
to diminish ZAPU and its military wing, and the North Korean-trained 
Fifth Brigade and Police Intelligence did its best to ensure that the threat 
was eliminated.
This seemingly warranted the government to declare a state of emergency in 
1982 and to deploy security forces to uproot the so-called ‘dissidents’, but the 
witch hunt exercise was extended to unarmed civilians who were suspected of 
having links with the ‘dissidents’. Eppel (2008:2–3) challenges the actions of 
the government by arguing that the motive of the government to repress the 
so-called dissidents was misguided because it emanated from Mugabe’s interest 
to create a de facto one-party state. She recalls that arms caches were also 
discovered across the country, including the territories controlled by ZANLA, 
but ZANU-PF used the discovery of arms in Matabeleland as a reference 
point to unleash a long-held political agenda. Eppel (2008:4) observes that the 
amount of force (about 5 000 armed footmen) used by the government was not 
proportional to the claimed threat of ‘dissidents’ (about 400 people). More so, 
the actions of the Fifth Brigade (who were predominantly Shona speaking) were 
unjustified because they associated being Ndebele with being a ZAPU supporter 
and a sympathiser of the ‘dissidents’ (CCJPZ 1997:44). 
The fact that such atrocities occurred and that the government did not take 
adequate measures to prevent them, renders the government responsible for 
committing crimes against humanity. The Gukurahundi massacres were not part 
of a just war because the government used excessive force before it had exhausted 
negotiations with ZAPU officials who it accused of instigating its military 
wing to destabilise the country (Eppel 2008:4). Gukurahundi destabilised the 
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region and created a negative impression amongst victims and survivors that 
the government had a vendetta against the non-Shona speaking population. 
The Matabeleland massacres officially ended with the signing of the negotiated 
Unity Accord on 22 December 1987 between ZANU-PF led by Robert Mugabe 
and ZAPU led by Joshua Nkomo, which led to the amalgamation of the two 
parties into a de facto one-party state under Robert Mugabe’s party (Mlambo 
2014:199). 
Minimal efforts have been made by the government to address the atrocities 
that occurred, including the Dumbutshena and Chihambakwe Commissions 
of Enquiry in 1981 and 1983 respectively, and the Organ for National Healing, 
Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI)3 established in 2009 (Mashingaidze 
2010:23). The reports of the two commissions regarding the clashes at Entumbane 
and Gukurahundi were never made public and in its work, ONHRI encountered 
many obstacles, particularly relating to the lack of political will from parties 
involved in coming up with a national framework for reconciliation. In spite 
of the gravity of the Matabeleland massacres, the government seemingly did 
not make provisions to prevent the use of excessive force by security agents and 
ZANU-PF militias against civilians in successive conflicts such as the food riots in 
1998, fast-tracked land reform since 2000, electoral violence against opposition 
parties since 2000 and Operation Murambatsvina4 in 2005. The atrocities that 
occurred during these episodes remain unaccounted for and much of the work 
to address the past is being driven by community leaders and CSOs, with little 
support from the government (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru 2013:91).
2. Research design
This article draws on fieldwork in Nkayi District (see map insert) in April 2014, 
examining the scope and limits of reconciliation processes in Matabeleland. 
3 ONHRI was established in 2009 to investigate ways to address past injustices in the country, 
following the procedures set by the 2008 Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)-mediated Global Political Agreement (GPA) (Mashingaidze 2010:25)
4 Operation Murambatsvina refers to the militarised uprooting of informal settlements in 
the urban areas across the country, which resulted in the displacement of over 600 000 
people and a direct loss of sources of income for 1.7 million people (Sokwanele 2005).
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The fieldwork involved 36 participants drawn from government officials who 
served in the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC)5 
and ONHRI, civil society representatives, community members in Nkayi 
and academics. 
Map of Zimbabwe, adopted from Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 2012.
The Nkayi District has a population of 109 135 people. It was selected as the site 
for this qualitative research project because of the plurality of its population 
(for example Kalanga, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, Sotho and Tsonga speaking 
communities live there, among others) (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 
2012), which made it possible for the researcher to capture a diversity of 
5  JOMIC was established in 2009 to supervise the implementation of the GPA, which, in the 
process, led it to facilitate peacebuilding programs that included creating an atmosphere for 


















'We cannot reconcile until the past has been acknowledged'
perceptions on reconciliation. Empirical data were collected, using semi-
structured interviews, focus groups and observations (micro level) and archival 
documents (macro level). Additionally, snowball and stratified purposive 
sampling methods were used. 
The researcher was accompanied by an interpreter and co-researcher, and this 
small team faced several challenges, especially related to travelling, because the 
area is very remote. It has poor road networks and a large amount of time was 
lost to travelling, which included a 15 km trip on a donkey drawn cart on a route 
without regular conventional transport services. Upon arriving in the Nkayi 
District further challenges were encountered related to undertaking research 
in a rural setting and in a context in which security is a significant concern: 
an encounter with the police intelligence unit was one such challenge. These 
obstacles became part of the rich data that were collected as the research team 
experienced first-hand some of the realities experienced by these violence-
stricken communities in Matabeleland.
3. Local perspectives of violence
The violence participants described in the Matabeleland region (including 
the Nkayi District) can be arranged into three categories, namely: physical 
(inflictions on the human self), cultural (cultural actions used to legitimise the 
oppression of community groupings), and structural (institutionalised practices 
of society that harm or disadvantage individuals). These forms of violence are 
intertwined but minor distinctions can be made as discussed below.
3.1 Physical violence
Of the 36 participants in the study, 20 indicated that they had endured physical 
violence in the past 30 years. Most of the incidents of violence described by 
participants were associated with the Gukurahundi era, with a few incidents 
reported to have occurred after 2000. The participants identified the Fifth Brigade 
soldiers, the Police Internal Security and Intelligence (PISI), ‘dissidents’ and 
ZANU-PF youth militias as the main perpetrators. The tensions that facilitated 
the Gukurahundi massacres were ascribed to the mistrust between ZANU-PF and 
ZAPU that emanated from the Second Chimurenga, whilst the post-2000 violence 
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was blamed on the rejection of opposition movements by the ruling government. 
The latter phenomenon characterises the atmosphere of political intolerance 
that features throughout the country’s history. Sachikonye (2011:1–20) observes 
that the government of Zimbabwe has a long-standing history of intolerance 
because political leaders have ruled the country for many years based on one-
party-leadership models. Both the pre-independence regime (under Ian Smith) 
and post-independence regime (under Robert Mugabe) have been embroiled in 
political conflict aimed at destroying legitimate alternative political parties which 
could compel the incumbent party to account for past injustices.
According to Galtung (1969:168), physical violence is the intentional use of a body 
part or object to inflict pain, discomfort or injury on another in order to repress 
the victim. One (82-year-old) participant narrated her Gukurahundi encounter: 
‘I was beaten up by the soldiers, my husband was shot dead, my daughter and 
granddaughter were abducted and raped’. A similar encounter was shared by 
another participant (a 73-year-old male) who said, ‘The Fifth Brigade soldiers beat 
me up and left me for dead because they said I was supporting dissidents’.
The researcher observed that some ‘dissidents’ inflicted physical violence on 
civilians. One (54-year-old) gentleman shared that:
Dissidents came to our house and gathered us in the kitchen. They beat 
me, my mother, father and other siblings. When my father was bleeding to 
death from the wounds, they took out a gun and shot him. They instructed 
me to get an axe and chop my father into pieces. They told me to put my 
father’s head in a box and take it to the soldiers to inform them that they 
have dealt with their sell-out/informant. Upon returning from the soldiers’ 
camp I found my mother dead; she had committed suicide by tying herself 
with a rope in that kitchen.
The violence narrated by these participants corroborated accounts recorded by 
the civil society organisations, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 
and the Legal Resources Foundation (CCJP and LRF), during the 1990s. The 
CCJPZ 1997 report, Breaking the Silence, is the first unofficial document in the 
public domain that contains detailed information of the atrocities encountered 
by communities in Matabeleland and Midlands. In the absence of an account 
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of the incidents from the government, the report has become a source of 
reference with statistical figures that relate the extent of the atrocities, including 
an estimated 20 000 deaths, torture and displacement of thousands (CCJPZ 
1997:6). Nordquist (2007:9) argues that encounters of violence such as narrated 
above are mostly experienced by civilians, but little attention is given by some 
governments to address the effects thereof. As such, it can be observed with the 
Matabeleland massacres that the government of Zimbabwe has ignored calls by 
victims to address the violence in order to protect its own interests. 
3.2 Cultural violence
All 36 participants related incidents of cultural violence in Matabeleland. The 
examples that follow show that pockets of cultural intolerance existed between 
the Shona and Ndebele speaking people. According to Farmer (1996:277), 
culture refers to the varying values, norms and practices of the population that 
are shared by a particular grouping. He adds that cultural tolerance enables a 
community with diverse groupings to share common modes of life and negotiate 
the differences. Cultural violence occurs in instances where the distinct features 
of a particular cultural group are used to suppress the other groupings (Farmer 
1996:278). Ten participants in Nkayi emphasised that they were forced to 
speak Shona during Gukurahundi in order to survive the gruesome attacks by 
government security forces. A 49-year-old woman, who was 18 years old at the 
time of the attack, related that: 
It was a Friday in April 1983. I remember that four men of the Fifth Brigade 
soldiers arrived at our compound early in the morning and called everyone 
out. They asked us [a family of eight] in Shona to tell them where the 
dissidents are hiding but no one could give an answer because we did not 
understand the language they were speaking [Shona]. They started calling 
us names; for example ‘mapenzi evanhu muchadura kwaari madissidents 
enyu’ (you rascals you are going to tell us where your dissidents are hiding), 
and they beat the whole family with the barrel of their guns calling us to tell 
them about the whereabouts of the dissidents. 
The above narrative indicates that the Shona language was used to suppress 
‘dissidents’ and civilians who were suspected of supporting them. During the 
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massacres, the government security forces who were predominantly Shona, 
seemingly associated all non-Shona speaking people with the ‘dissidents’. That 
exposed many civilians in the region to violence. Gukurahundi dehumanised the 
Ndebele ethnic group (who are a majority in the region) because if one could 
not speak Shona one faced torture or death. The CCJPZ report also documented 
that during Gukurahundi the Fifth Brigade soldiers often gathered people to 
a central point at gunpoint in the evenings, for example at a school (CCJPZ 
1997:51). The people would be coerced to sing Shona songs that praised the 
ZANU-PF government. This trend of using the Shona language and practices 
to coerce people into committing particular actions seems to have continued 
even after the Gukurahundi massacres. Between March and June 2008, the ruling 
party is claimed to have used youth militias to terrorise the community after 
failing to win the March elections (Sachikonye 2011:20). One woman (28 years 
old) related:
The post-March 2008 contested election period was a difficult time because 
people felt threatened by the government, especially the ZANU-PF youth 
militias. They hosted overnight praises ‘pungwe’, singing Shona songs and 
we were being coerced to attend. 
The Shona language has become a symbol of domination in the region. Its 
continued use by the ruling party, as narrated above, reinforces the oppression 
of other ethnic groups, in this case Ndebele people. 
3.3 Structural violence
According to Galtung (1969:170), structural violence comprises the subtle and 
often invisible systemic ways in which the settings of the community deny some 
individuals access to socio-economic progress. 
Structural violence, as described by the research participants, has been instigated 
by government through policies that deny some people rights and privileges 
enjoyed by others. Whilst acknowledging that Matabeleland falls under climate 
region 5, which receives low and erratic rainfall that makes the area naturally 
uninhabitable, both the Smith and Mugabe regimes have done little to improve 
the living conditions of the people (Eppel 2008:1). As argued by Eppel (2008:2), 
45
'We cannot reconcile until the past has been acknowledged'
the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 forced resettlement of the Ndebele people 
into infertile regions and the subsequent Land Husbandry Act in 1951 resulted in 
forced destocking and the subjection of many to hunger, poverty and starvation. 
This pushed the black community led by Joshua Nkomo to organise themselves 
into liberation movements and fight against the segregation practices of the 
Smith regime, but they faced further repressive policies, such as the Law and 
Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) of 1960 (Mlambo 2014:147). LOMA gave the 
white regime’s security forces authority to arrest and detain supporters of the 
nationalist movements, resulting in the detention and banning of members 
of ZAPU in 1962. Further repression continued until the ousting of the white 
regime in 1979.
Even though the nationalist movements fought for the removal of repressive 
policies such as LOMA, ZANU-PF reinstated the policy during the Gukurahundi 
era, which led to the instigation of curfews and detention of ZAPU officials and 
defected ex-ZIPRA combatants (Eppel 2008:4). As it was the intention of the 
Smith regime to dismantle nationalist movements, it appeared that Mugabe’s 
regime employed the same policy to eliminate rivalry from ZAPU and the 
so-called dissidents. 
As documented by the CCJPZ report (1997:48), the food curfews in 1983 and 
1984 sanctioned by the government exposed an estimated 400 000 people in 
Matabeleland to starvation. The ruthless actions of the government made people 
vulnerable considering that their region receives erratic rains which affect their 
agricultural outputs. Raftopoulos (2009:220) documents that the government 
further subjected over two million people in the country (Matabeleland region 
included) to poverty through its Operation Murambatsvina policy in 2005. 
He argues that the operation was a disguised political plot by ZANU-PF to 
dismantle the support bases of its long-standing political rival, the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai. A participant 
(a 38-year-old female) narrated that:
When my husband was killed in 2002 for supporting the MDC, I had to 
step in and look after our three children. I became a cross border trader, 
buying cheap clothes and selling them in the city. I have had to move back 
to the village because Operation Murambatsvina disrupted the clothing stall 
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I owned when I was in Bulawayo in 2005. I have not been able to regain 
capital to start the business again and I am now struggling to look after 
my children.
Other features of structural violence that remain pertinent to the region as 
shared by the participants were inadequate water supply, the shortage of 
qualified educators and poor infrastructure. One participant (a 49-year-old 
female) shared that:
The quality of education in the Matabeleland region has been affected by 
the lack of resources, particularly educators, such that even the throughput 
rate of children in the region from primary to secondary is low, hence not 
so many children are making it to tertiary level. For example, NUST, which 
is a Science and Technology university in Bulawayo, is mostly recruiting 
students from the other regions and not Matabeleland in spite of the 
advantage that it is a home university to the region.
The above narrative reveals that the deployment of unqualified educators to 
the region is affecting the performance of students. According to Dube (2014), 
Ndebele speaking people living in Matabeleland have raised concern over the 
deployment in their region of Shona educators who cannot speak Ndebele, 
compelling their children to learn in a different language. In 2014 the Deputy 
Minister of Primary and Secondary Education, Professor Paul Mavhima, publicly 
acknowledged that there is a problem relating to the language of instruction in 
the Matabeleland region (The Chronicle 2014). The Deputy Minister informed 
the people of Matabeleland that the deployment of non-Ndebele speaking 
educators to the region was a contingency plan of the government to address the 
shortage of qualified educators who can teach in Ndebele. The main argument 
raised by participants to challenge the deployments of the government is that 
the use of Shona language by non-Ndebele speaking educators is affecting the 
level of literacy among non-Shona speaking students. In addition, it infringes on 
the constitutional right of learners to learn in a medium of instruction in which 
they have proficiency. As stated by the participants, the Shona language serves as 
a constant reminder to the community of their suffering during Gukurahundi 
and a symbol of oppression that has left survivors of the massacres with lasting 
negative associations with the language.  
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4. The contribution of the government and CSOs to 
reconciliation in Matabeleland
The official processes for reconciliation in Matabeleland have been reduced to 
reconciliation events. Long and Brecke (2003:7) describe reconciliation events 
as: direct engagements between senior representatives of the warring parties, 
a public ceremony shown on national media, or symbolic actions that portray 
peaceful relations between former enemies. Many senior members of the 
government and the opposition parties in Zimbabwe have superficially rubbed 
shoulders in public. One participant (a 73-year-old male) said:
In 2012 I attended a workshop at the community hall and benefitted a 
lot from the open discussions because it [JOMIC] presented a platform 
to speak openly about the past. As a result I learned to tolerate my fellow 
community members from the practical exercise where political party 
representatives [Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), 
Movement for Democratic Change-Ncube (MDC-N) and ZANU-PF] were 
interacting with one another in a friendly manner in public.
These gestures seemingly portrayed the warring parties as friends in a mutual 
relationship, but the continued fighting between ZANU-PF and MDC-T indicates 
a lack of reconciliation. This case can be illustrated by public statements of 
Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe. Morgan Tsvangirai (leader of MDC-T) 
in June 2013 at a rally in Chitungwiza attacked his main rival Mugabe, calling 
him a puppet of the military. Similarly Mugabe has publicly used demeaning 
words to refer to Tsvangirai whom he labels a puppet of the Western bloc seeking 
to topple the ruling party for implementing the controversial land reforms 
(Chiripasi 2013). The government has even deployed security forces to terrorise 
MDC-T members resulting in the abduction, murder and torture of hundreds 
of opposition representatives and supporters since 2000 (Sachikonye 2011:20).
As mentioned earlier, the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, the Unity Accord 
in 1987 and the recent GPA in September 2008 are further examples of events 
that produced cursory reconciliation (Mashingaidze 2010:21–24). The GPA was 
a mediated political agreement signed in September 2008 to resolve the June 
2008 polarised elections between ZANU-PF, led by Mugabe, and the two MDC 
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formations, namely, MDC-T, led by the then Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, 
and MDC-N led by Welshman Ncube (Mashingaidze 2010:24). This led to the 
formation of the ‘inclusive government’ in which ZANU-PF and the two MDC 
factions co-governed until the elections of 2013.
Long and Brecke (2003:7) argue that reconciliation should not be limited to 
an event because it is a process of change the community ought to go through. 
Reconciliation speaks to the lifestyle of a people previously divided by a gruesome 
past, by transforming the patterns of destructive behaviours and attitudes 
between former enemies into constructive relationships that foster sustainable 
peace. This means that reconciliation should be cultivated through on-going 
processes that inspire former enemies to live as humans-in-relationship (Lederach 
1997:26). As mentioned earlier, the inability of the government to make public 
the findings of the Chihambakwe and Dumbutshena Commissions (1981 and 
1983 respectively) over the years has derailed the deepening of reconciliation 
processes in Matabeleland. The Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry was 
established to investigate the violence that occurred at Entumbane in Bulawayo 
and other demobilisation camps across the country following the 1981 clashes 
between ZANLA and ZIPRA ex-combatants. The Chihambakwe Commission 
of Inquiry was established to investigate the Gukurahundi massacres in the 
Midlands and Matabeleland regions (Mashingaidze 2010:24). The Clemency 
Order No. 1 of 18 April 1988 which granted blanket amnesty to all parties who 
administered violence during the massacres has made the government reluctant 
to release the findings of the commissions, citing that digging into the past 
can incite further conflict (CCJPZ 1997:6). Many human rights activists on 
the contrary, for example the Zimbabwe Victims of Organised Violence Trust 
(ZIVOVT) and Ibhetshu LikaZulu, have been pushing the government to release 
the findings on the grounds that knowing the truth about the past provides 
closure and paves the way for healing and reconciliation (Ndou 2012).
The subsequent efforts at reconciliation by the government, namely, JOMIC 
and ONHRI in 2009, have been abortive, like the preceding initiatives. One 
participant (a 54-year-old male) said, ‘I have attended discussion sessions held 
by JOMIC and ONHRI but I am disappointed that they have not done any 
follow-up sessions to assist us on matters of truth and justice we raised.’
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JOMIC was disbanded after the 2013 elections because its mandate to monitor 
the implementation of the GNU was redundant. The main criticism raised 
against JOMIC was its failure to address the issues surrounding politically 
motivated violence destabilising the community (Zimbabwe Independent 2013). 
ONHRI was dissolved in 2013 and is set to be replaced by the National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) as stipulated by the new Constitution which 
was adopted by parliament in February 2013 (The Zimbabwean 2014). Regardless 
of efforts to establish various official processes for reconciliation, the lack of 
political will on the part of the government over the decades has rendered the 
processes merely cosmetic gestures designed to safeguard its political hegemony. 
As of the writing of this article the work of the NPRC had not commenced, but 
the aspirations of the affected Matabeleland community are for the commission 
to provide truth, justice, reconciliation and sustainable peace.
Several CSOs were identified by participants in the Nkayi District for their 
contribution as pillars of support and a voice for the wounded. The Roman 
Catholic Church, Red Cross International and Counselling Services Unit (CSU) 
in Zimbabwe have provided shelter, medical, psychological and social support. 
One lady (58 years old) shared the following:
My son and I received counselling from members of the CSU after we 
were attacked by ZANU-PF youth militias in 2007. I am grateful for their 
help because it gave me comfort to know that someone showed concern 
for my ordeal.
These organisations are sources of information with records of injustices 
suffered by the community, which can be used to give evidence in the future 
(as the participants believe they might be able to pursue justice through the 
courts, should a change of government occur). The government has been 
conducting strong surveillance on CSOs to prevent community engagements 
that delve into the past and might unveil truth by which it (the government) 
would be implicated. One CSO representative said, ‘For the past three years 
our organisation has been stuck in a deadlock with a government official 
over the reburial of persons that died during the Gukurahundi massacres’. 
The consequence of these encounters is that ‘controversial projects’ are 
postponed for fear of victimisation by government security forces.
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The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and Solidarity Peace Trust 
have assisted community members with legal representation for unlawful arrest 
and detention. The National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NANGO) and Bulawayo Agenda have conducted workshops providing them 
with voter education, and skills in political tolerance and non-violent conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), Habakkuk 
Trust and Radio Dialogue have strengthened the community by providing a 
safe space to share it's experiences. One participant (an 82-year-old female) 
said, ‘I attended a public discussion hosted by Radio Dialogue for victims of 
Gukurahundi. I felt liberated to know that I am not the only one who had been 
humiliated by government security forces’.
This narrative highlights the plea of many participants – that they need a 
safe environment to share their experiences with an audience that will not 
condemn or intimidate them. The following section will explore further 
ways, identified by community members, in which reconciliation might be 
facilitated in their communities.
5. Perspectives of reconciliation in Matabeleland
As mentioned in the introduction, this article is guided by the definition of 
Brounéus (2003:20) that reconciliation is a societal process of addressing 
the past through mutual acknowledgement of the sufferings incurred, and 
of transforming destructive behaviours and attitudes. The researcher asked 
participants what processes would facilitate reconciliation for them in their 
communities. Their responses included the need for acknowledgement of the 
past, truth-telling and apology among others, which will be discussed here in 
more detail.
Firstly, participants emphasised that the government needs to acknowledge 
the gross human rights violations it committed, from Gukurahundi to 
post-2000 electoral violence. President Mugabe superficially acknowledged 
the Matabeleland massacres in a speech he gave at the funeral of Vice-
President Joshua Nkomo in 1999 by labelling the encounter a ‘moment of 
madness’ (Mashingaidze 2010:23). One participant (a 54-year-old male) 
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said, ‘Reconciliation is acknowledgement of past inactions that goes beyond 
announcing that it was a moment of madness’.
An academic expert among the participants asserted:
To begin reconciliation in Matabeleland we need to acknowledge violence 
at the executive and legislative level. Currently we have a constitution and 
a new commission set to address these issues, but what is its use if a Bill in 
Parliament does not enact it? 
Participants have suggested some practical ways to acknowledge the past, 
including the exhumation and reburial of people in mass graves, the 
establishment of memorial sites and museums (like Germany’s Holocaust 
Memorial Museum) for people to celebrate their history and collectively 
honour the past. One (a 49-year-old female) said:
There are many unidentified graves in Matabeleland, the least that the 
government can do to help survivors ease off the pain they have been 
holding for the past 30 years is exhuming mass graves, identifying the 
deceased, and giving bereaved families the opportunity to mourn and 
rebury their beloved ones in a proper manner.
Eppel (2006:263) concedes that during the Gukurahundi massacres many of 
the people that died were buried in mass graves because the communities were 
too unstable for people to conduct proper burials. She argues that many of the 
mass graves have not been exhumed and this has left communities without 
possession of the remains of their loved ones. In the Zimbabwean African 
culture, proper burial of the remains of a deceased party is a crucial element 
in the moral fabric of communities. Giving proper burial to deceased parties 
is a sign of respect to both the living and spiritual worlds. Eppel (2006:264) 
adds that to the living world, burial symbolises respect for human dignity. To 
the spiritual world, burial is a passage rite that allows the spirit of the deceased 
to reconnect with the ancestral family. The inability of bereaved families to 
bury victims of Gukurahundi and other episodes of violence in Matabeleland 
remains a contentious issue because of the moral obligation of the African 
community to respect both the living and spiritual worlds.
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Secondly, truth-telling was identified as being important for reconciliation to 
occur. Thirty-five participants in the study indicated that truth-telling is a key 
component of reconciliation. One participant (an 82-year-old female) said:
Reconciliation for me means that the perpetrator is prepared to come to the 
victim with a genuine desire to engage in peaceful dialogue with the victim by 
giving the victim the opportunity to ask the unanswered questions they hold. 
Truth-telling is central for many of the participants because it will allow the 
community an opportunity to come to terms with its memories of the past. 
Villa-Vicencio (2000:2011) argues that any mechanism that seeks to provide 
reconciliation should have an understanding of the past. Truth-telling can assist 
in creating the space for open dialogue on issues, after which communities 
can acknowledge or deny realities of what occurred and thus gain more 
understanding of the past. As mentioned earlier, the report developed by the 
Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources 
Foundation Zimbabwe in 1997 has become a key record (unofficial truth) with 
accounts of the injustices that occurred during the Gukurahundi era. 
The government has not commented on the injustices documented in the CCJPZ 
report, leading the people of Matabeleland to assume that their experiences have 
been ignored (Mashingaidze 2010:23). These sentiments are exacerbated by the 
refusal of the government to make public the findings of the Chihambakwe and 
Dumbutshena Commissions of Inquiry. Other collections of truth about the 
injustices that occurred over the decades have emerged from academic writing 
and records made by CSOs, for example, Grace to Heal, Counselling Services 
Unit and the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). 
Thirdly, participants emphasised the need for the government to offer an apology 
to the people of Matabeleland, particularly victims of various episodes of violence, 
in order for the past to be recognised. One participant (a 39-year-old male) said:
The residual hatred in Matabeleland cannot be cured unless there is a deep 
regret, acknowledgement and apology from the perpetrators of violence. 
The government should move away from declaring ‘let bygones be bygones’ 
or it was a ‘moment of madness’.
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A 46-year-old male participant asked, ‘If Gukurahundi was a moment of 
madness, the question becomes, has the mad person regained sanity now? Has 
he atoned for the period of madness, and what should the aggrieved do about it?’
Rosoux (2008:548) points out that an apology is either a written or a spoken 
expression of one’s regret or remorse for committing unkind actions. According 
to CCJPZ (1997:5), the late Minister of Defence, Mr Moven Mahachi, was the 
only government official who publicly expressed regret for the Gukurahundi 
massacres. The Sunday Mail of 6 September 1992 reported on an interview with 
the late minister, in which he was apologetic for the Gukurahundi atrocities and 
cautioned that no citizen of the country should repeat such injustices (CCJPZ 
1997:5). Mashingaidze (2010:23) argues that if the government offers an 
apology to victims, this could be an indication that it is willing to acknowledge 
the past, show respect for the dignity of victims and take responsibility for the 
lives that were affected. Instead many government officials have publicly denied 
responsibility, including the newly appointed Vice-President Phelekezela 
Mphoko, who announced to the press in February 2015 that Gukurahundi was a 
plot of the Western bloc to destabilise the country (Sunday News Reporter 2015). 
The government continues to shift blame for the massacres onto Britain and 
America who, it alleges, were buying time to distract Mugabe from addressing 
the land question. Participants, however, feel the need for transparency about 
the massacres because it was the responsibility of the government to protect its 
citizens from such inhumane actions.
As participants highlighted the above-mentioned needs, they emphasised 
that reconciliation is a process. One participant (a 38-year-old female) shared 
the following:
The government should not assume that the signing of the Unity Accord in 
1987 and labelling the Gukurahundi era a ‘moment of madness’ has atoned 
for the atrocities that occurred. People’s lives were disrupted for seven 
years, they therefore need to be consulted on the processes of reconciliation 
that will resolve the issues they have and not be constricted [sic] to get over 
their experiences briskly.
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One CSO representative (a 73-year-old male) who was also a victim of violence 
during the Gukurahundi era mentioned that:
Reconciliation requires forgiveness, but forgiveness should occur as a 
process and not an event. Christianity has helped me to move on at an 
interpersonal level, because I take from the Lord’s Prayer that I must forgive 
those who trespass against me. I still require truth in order to be at peace 
with the past.
Hamber (2007:119) describes the forgiveness mentioned above as an act of good 
will, which means that the victim chooses to forgive in order to stop feeling 
disempowered by the past. This involves acknowledging that the victim is not a 
subject under a perpetrator but a survivor of an inevitable past.
Most of the participants did consider the possibility of pursuing justice for 
Gukurahundi violations through the courts, but the government has paralyzed 
the process. The blanket amnesty offered in 1988 prevented perpetrators from 
being held accountable as it may, arguably, have implicated government officials 
(Eppel 2008:4). Participants also cited that security forces have been used by the 
government to intimidate victims and prevent them from speaking out. 
6. Conclusion
Over the past three decades the calls for truth and justice by victims of 
Gukurahundi have been ignored and the grievances of the victims have not 
been addressed. Current efforts of the government have created amnesties 
for perpetrators and the political decrees of the government have allowed for 
a complete avoidance of addressing the past. However, this ‘amnesia’ is not an 
option for the people of Matabeleland because, as the fieldwork evidence shows, 
they have not forgotten the suffering they experienced. To promote genuine 
reconciliation the participants want: acknowledgement from the government 
of its responsibility in orchestrating mass violations, an apology, truth-telling, 
exhumations and reburials, memorial sites or museums to honour those who 
perished, and a recognition of their collective history. Although CSOs have 
supported victims by providing shelter, medical, psychological, legal and social 
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services, they have faced obstacles, particularly in the form of victimisation from 
security forces sanctioned by the government to prevent CSOs from revealing 
past injustices. 
It is yet to be seen if the needs of the participants will be addressed by the National 
Peace and Reconciliation Commission that is in the process of being established.
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